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Civil Procedure

constitutional violation by removing the notice of claim requirement. 13
13. Compare N.R.S. §244.245 1 with Turner v. Staggs, 89 Nev. 230, 240, 510 P.2d 879, 885886 (1973).

Civil Procedure; hearings on notice of pendency of an action
N.R.S. §14.015 (amended).
SB 670 (Committee on Judiciary); STATS 1981, Ch 749
(Effective June 15, 1981)
In actions to foreclose a mortgage or to affect the title or possession
of real property; a plaintiff upon filing the complaint, or a defendant
seeking affirmative relief in the answer, may file notice of the pendency
of the action (hereinafter referred to as lis pendens) with the county
recorder. 1 The non-recording party may petition the court for a hearing to determine the necessity of retaining the notice of lis pendens. 2
This hearing must be scheduled as soon as is practicable. 3 Prior to the
enactment of Chapter 749, the party who caused notice of lis pendens
to be recorded ha<;f to appear at the hearing upon five days notice.
Chapter 749, however, extends the notice period to fifteen days. 4
At the hearing, the party who recorded notice of the lis pendens must
establish that (1) the underlying action is for the foreclosure of a mortgage or affects the title of the property described in the notice, 5 (2) the
action was not brought for an improper motive, 6 (3) all conditions precedent to obtaining the relief sought can be performed by the party
who caused notice to be recorded, 7 and (4) the recording party would
be injured by a transfer of an interest in the property, prior to the termination of the action. 8 Under prior law, these matters had to be
proven by a preponderence of the evidence .9 Chapter 749 requires that
they be established to the satisfaction ofthe court. 10 As a general matter
this degree of proof is considered to be greater than proof by a pre1. See N.R.S. §14.010 1.
2. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (5th ed. 1976).
3. See N.R.S. §14.015 1.
4. Compare id §14.015 2 with STATUTES OF NEVADA 1979, c. 507, §1, at 982 (enacting
N.R.S. §14.015 2).
5. See N.R.S. §14.015 2(a).
6. See id §14.015 2(b).
7. See id §14.015 2(c).
8. See id §14.015 2(d).
9. See STATUTES OF NEVADA 1979, C. 507, §1, at 982.
10. See N.R.S. §14.015 2.
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ponderence of the evidence. 11
Formerly, the party who recorded the notice also had to prove by a
preponderence of the evidence that probable cause existed to support
the belief that he or she would prevail in the underlying action and that
the relief requested would affect the title or possession of the real propertyY Chapter 749 now requires the party who caused notice to be
recorded to establish to the satisfaction of the court that he or she is
likely to prevail 13 or that there is a fair chance of success on the merits14 and that he or she would suffer a greater hardship by the transfer
of an interest in the property prior to the termination of the action than
any hardship suffered by the non-recording party resulting from the
notice of lis pendens. 15 In addition it must be established that if the
recording party prevails he or she will be entitled to relief affecting the
title or possession of the real property. 16
11. See generally 75 AM. JuR. Trial §825 (1974); Annot., 147 A.L.R. 380 (1943) (differing
views on the degree of proof required to satisfy this standard).
12. See STATUTES OF NEVADA 1979, C. 507, §1, at 982.
13. See N.R.S. §14.015 3(a).
14. See id §14.015 3(b).
15. See id
16. See id

Civil Procedure; admissibility of statements of a decedent
N.R.S. §48.- (new).
SB 357 (Committee on Judiciary); STATS 1981, Ch 220
Prior to 1979, Nevada law required corroborative evidence in order
to admit into evidence conversations or transactions of a deceased person} This statutory requirement was repealed in 1979. 2 To clarify existing law, Chapter 220 expressly indicates that the repeal of the statute
relating to the admissibility of conversations or transactions of deceased persons was not intended to revive the common law dead man's
statute. 3 Moreover, with the enactment of Chapter 220, evidence will
not be rendered inadmissible solely because it is evidence of transactions or conversations of a deceased person.4
1. See STATUTES OF NEVADA 1971, c. 402, §110.5, at 794 (amending N.R.S. §51).
2. See STATUTES OF NEVADA 1979, c. 134, §1, at 198 (repealing N.R.S. §48.064).
3. See STATUTES OF NEVADA 1981, c. 220, §2, at-. See generally, Lilly, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §23 (1978); 81 AM. JUR. 2nd §§303-412 (1976) (dead man statutes).
4. See N.R.S. §48. - .
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